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ABSTRACT 
 The Philippines needs a comprehensive maritime domain awareness (MDA) 
capability to counter increased state and non-state maritime threats. One of the goals of 
the Philippine military modernization program is to improve maritime situational 
awareness through the Philippine Navy Maritime Situational Awareness System 
(PNMSAS). The primary aim of this research is to understand the current status of the 
PNMSAS, the gaps, and the potential role of maritime special operations forces in 
enhancing the Philippines’ maritime situational awareness. This qualitative research 
utilizes data gleaned from government documents and key informant interviews, as well 
as information obtained from published literature. The Philippine Navy has undertaken 
several initiatives to date. These include the establishment of new coast watch stations 
and the upgrading of existing ones, and the procurement of new naval platforms that can 
augment information collection for maritime situational awareness. The Philippines, 
however, is hampered by scant resources and the long-term delivery of acquired land-
based and mobile sensors, and thus needs to look for a cost-effective information 
collection system that does not depend on expensive technology alone. This thesis 
examines the potential role of maritime special operations forces as a low cost/low 
technology solution that will augment existing initiatives and enhance the Philippine 
Navy’s maritime domain awareness capability. 
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A. BACKGROUND   
The Republic of the Philippines is an archipelagic sovereign state in Southeast Asia 
with 7,641 islands1 and a total maritime area of 586,210 square nautical miles. Surrounding 
the archipelago are three central water bodies: the Philippine Sea in the west, the Sulu-
Celebes sea in the south, and the Pacific Ocean in the east. Due to its fragmented 
topography, the Philippines has one of the longest coastlines globally, spanning about 
10,850 miles. The Philippines’ maritime domain also bears geopolitical, military, and 
economic significance. Maritime Domain refers to “all areas and things of, on, under, 
relating to adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including 
all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, and people, cargo, and vessels, and other 
conveyances.”2 The Philippines’ archipelagic makeup and location have a distinct strategic 
advantage of a central position and a good base for military operations. One of the best 
shipping routes from the South China Sea (SCS) to the Pacific Ocean passes through the 
Philippine archipelago. Serving as a regular transit area of foreign-registered vessels, the 
Philippines accommodates a high volume of marine traffic. The Philippines is also a part 
of the Coral Triangle, a center of marine biodiversity that yields a rich reserve of marine 
resources. To the east of Luzon island is the Philippine Rise,3 with a span of 24.4 million 
hectares. This unexplored region shows promising natural gas deposits and minerals 
essential in the production of steel. However, despite the numerous advantages and benefits 
the country is reaping from its unique disposition and formation, growing multifaceted 
challenges continue to beset the country. These challenges include preserving sovereignty 
over the country’s waters, manifestations of maritime terrorism, increasing maritime 
security threats, and various maritime violations such as foreign vessel intrusion, illegal 
 
1 Deped Tambayan, “There Are 7,641 Islands in the Philippines,” Deped Tambayan (blog), accessed 
October 14, 2020, https://www.depedtambayanph.net/2019/10/there-are-7641-islands-in-philippines.html. 
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Strategy for Maritime Security,” last modified 
May 8, 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/national-plan-achieve-maritime-domain-awareness. 
3 Formerly known as Benham Rise. Source: Executive Order No. 25 s. 201, “Executive Order No. 25 
s. 2017” (2017), https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2017/05/16/executive-order-no-25-s-2017/. 
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fishing, trafficking, smuggling, and piracy. Having extensive and complex maritime 
challenges, the Philippines needs to have a robust, efficient, and dependable navy 
monitoring the maritime domain.  
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is defined as “the effective understanding of 
any activity associated with the maritime environment that could impact the security, 
safety, economy or environment.”4 Achieving MDA is critical for maritime security, 
especially in an archipelagic and maritime nation like the Philippines.5  It is also a common 
understanding that the foundation of maritime security is situational awareness. Situational 
awareness is achieved by gathering timely and relevant information, establishing a reliable 
database and analysis, and rapidly disseminating to forces able to act on the MDA 
information. Maritime domain awareness in the Philippines is still in a relatively nascent 
stage. In March 2009, when the Philippine Baseline Act (R.A. No. 9522) was signed into 
law, the Philippines began to shift its focus from internal operations, such as 
counterinsurgency/counterterrorism, to external defense, such as maritime security. This 
law extended the country’s maritime boundaries that incorporated the Spratly Islands (see 
Figure 1). After that, China’s increasing assertiveness in the West Philippine Sea6 (WPS), 
manifested by Chinese naval presence in Philippine sovereign waters, deployment of 
fishery patrol vessels, and other coercive diplomacy measures designed to consolidate 
China’s jurisdictional claims.7 These sea forces focus on security enforcement of China’s 
established territorial waters in the South China Sea and increase the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) to engage in other international waters. 
In addition to expanding its naval reach in the WPS, China has effectively 
manipulated a space called the “gray zone.” Such a “gray zone” allows for competitive 
 
4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Strategy.”1 
5 Christian Bueger, “Effective Maritime Domain Awareness in the Western Indian Ocean” (Working 
Paper, Institute for Security Studies, Unpublished, 2017), 2, http://rgdoi.net/10.13140/RG.2.2.10288.46089. 
6 The Philippine renamed the waters in the eastern part SCS as the West Philippine Sea to solidify its 
maritime sovereignty. Source:  Administrative Order No. 29, (Manila: Official Gazette of the Republic of 
the Philippines, 2012), https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2012/09/05/administrative-order-no-29-s-2012/. 
7 Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Philippines Discovers Its Maritime Domain: The Aquino 
Administration’s Shift in Strategic Focus from Internal to Maritime Security,” Asian Security 12, no. 2 
(May 3, 2016): 111, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2016.1195813. 
3 
interactions among state and non-state actors that aim to change the status quo without 
resulting in war. One noticeable element in China’s gray zone campaign is the utilization 
of its fishing fleet as maritime militias. With these ongoing developments, China’s gray-
zone maritime strategy poses a significant threat in the region.   
 
Figure 1. Territorial map claimed by the Philippines, showing internal 
waters, territorial sea, international treaty limits, and exclusive economic 
zone.8 
As one of the SCS dispute parties, the Philippines is significantly affected by 
China’s expanding reach and gray zone operations. This tactic’s inherent strategic 
ambiguity allows China to forward its claims inside the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) without resorting to armed conflict. China’s domineering presence in the WPS 
has made the Philippines realize the need to develop its naval capabilities to secure some 
 
8 Source: Roel Balingit, Territorial Map Claimed by the Philippines, Showing Internal Waters, 
Territorial Sea, International Treaty Limits and Exclusive Economic Zone, June 25, 2007, Wikipedia 
(blog), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ph_Territorial_Map.png. 
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of the features it is claiming in the WPS and the protection of its maritime borders.9 A 
major component of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) responsible for the 
Philippines’ naval defense is the Philippine Navy (PN). While it is vigorously pursuing the 
AFP Modernization program, particularly in deterrence capability, the PN must 
continuously adapt ways to perform its mandate of securing and preserving its maritime 
domain. To concentrate its efforts on critical roles and functions to effectively address 
maritime challenges, the Philippine Navy set forth its Active Archipelagic Defense 
Strategy (AADS) in 2013. One of the three concepts in the AADS, which is the central 
theme of this research, is Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA). The Philippine Navy 
Maritime Situational System Awareness System (PNMSAS) plays a vital role in ensuring 
that this MSA concept enhances MDA and border security. Embracing its role as guardian 
of the Philippine seas, the Philippine Navy, through the PNMSAS, should continuously 
adapt new situational awareness methods amidst fast technological innovations and 
changing regional dynamics.  
B. RESEARCH GOAL 
This research’s primary goal is to understand the current status of the PNMSAS, 
the gaps, and the potential role of maritime special operations forces (SOF) in enhancing 
the Philippines’ maritime situational awareness.  
This research paper aims to provide academic support, evaluation, and 
understanding of how to improve the PNMSAS through low-tech solutions, professional 
human resources, and inter-unit collaboration. The paper also aims to serve as a jumping 
off point for further studies on the feasibility of utilizing existing maritime SOF in the 
country. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research examines the developing importance of maritime domain awareness 
to the Philippines’ strategic plan. It addresses this main problem of how to enhance the 
 
9 De Castro, “The Philippines Discover Its Maritime Domain,” 111. 
5 
PNMSAS in a rapidly changing maritime environment. It also explores these related 
questions: 
1. What is the primary security challenge the Philippines is facing in its 
maritime domain? 
2. What initiatives has the Philippine Navy undertaken, in terms of maritime 
situational awareness, in countering the security challenge in its maritime 
domain? 
3. What are the issues and gaps of the PNMSAS? 
4. How can maritime special operations forces contribute to and enhance the 
PNMSAS? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATION 
This study focuses on the maritime situational awareness capability of the 
PNMSAS. It does not tackle the maritime situational capability of other maritime law 
enforcement agencies of the Philippines, such as the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), the 
Philippine National Police Maritime Group (PNP-MG), or the Bureau of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources (BFAR). While maritime domain awareness encompasses various 
maritime security challenges, this research will be highlighting and focusing on China’s 
expansionism in the West Philippine Sea. Restricted access to highly classified documents 
has also limited the reference materials for this study, especially on special operations 
forces’ participation in MDA settings. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This qualitative research utilizes data gleaned from source documents and key 
informants, mainly from the Philippine government, to describe the current situation and 
identify challenges faced by existing PNMSAS initiatives focusing on situational 
awareness. Interviews were conducted with selected subject matter experts (SMEs) on the 
PNMSAS through email correspondence. Existing literature was also reviewed. 
6 
F. THESIS OUTLINE 
The literature review in Chapter II discusses a brief concept of MDA situational 
awareness, as well as Philippine legal, strategic, and policy bases for MDA in the next 
chapter. The current and emerging threat to the Philippine maritime domain, emphasizing 
China’s interest and approach in the SCS, will also be briefly explained. The chapter ends 
with recommendations from several experts on how the Philippines should deal with 
China’s aggressive tactics, and a synthesis of what has been covered in the literature 
review.  
Chapter III introduces the PNMSAS, the structure of MRIC, and existing 
information collection capabilities. This chapter will discuss the challenges of PNMSAS 
and lays down the possible role of maritime SOF in addressing it. 
The final chapter brings together the conclusions drawn from the gap analysis and 
makes recommendations on future directions for improving the PNMSAS. 
  
7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
“The heart of the Maritime Domain Awareness program is accurate information, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of all vessels, cargo, and people extending 
well beyond our traditional maritime boundaries.” 
— President Bush, January 20, 2002 
 
A. MDA SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
The United Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO) defines MDA as  
“the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could 
impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation or region.”10 Before the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),11 most nations focused on 
maintaining the MDA of its territorial waters, or the band of water that extends 12 nautical 
miles from a coastal baseline. Also, most nations have been traditionally focusing on naval 
threats and law enforcement. Historically, MDA customarily refers to maritime 
intelligence, and the methods used are just visual observation at sea and ashore. Enhancing 
maritime intelligence during this developmental phase was through the latest optics 
technology and access to higher elevations. With the advent of technology such as radios, 
radars, satellites, AIS,12 and sensors, the maritime domain coverage against traditional 
naval threats has been extended, to a certain degree, beyond visual range. In the past, before 
the Cold War ended and the UNCLOS took effect, most of the navies of the world were 
primarily concentrated on maritime intelligence that was limited to the naval capabilities 
 
10 Dalaklis Dimitrios, “Improving Maritime Situational Awareness: Establishing a ‘Maritime Safety 
and Security Network’” (8th NMIOTC Annual Conference 2017, Chania-Greece, June 8, 2017), 
https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.24614.32329. 
11 UNCLOS was adapted in 1982 and entered into force in 1994. The Philippines was the eleventh 
country to ratify the treaty in 1984. 
12 The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a tracking system for all vessels over 300 gross tons. 
The vessel regularly transmits a ship’s position and heading, as well as ship identification information via 
VHF radio. This system is required by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
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and positions of naval platforms and troops of other nations.13 The national maritime law 
enforcement agencies were also limited only to intelligence gathering, to support law 
enforcement efforts during this period.  
During the last decade or so, the international community started to shift its 
attention to the maritime domain, encompassing traditional naval threats and state and non-
state transnational criminal activities.14 Two significant developments drove these 
changes. The first is the UNCLOS signing, which obligated nations to extend their 
maritime domain to their 200 nautical mile EEZ.15 EZ’s declaration appeared to take care 
of coastal states’ growing economic demand without expanding the span of a states’ 
territorial waters.16 This development ran parallel to nations’ attention regarding maritime 
security challenges such as smuggling, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, 
piracy, and IUU fishing.17  The second development is the end of the cold war, which 
altered some of the focus of naval intelligence towards non-state maritime threats. United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 55, 40, 
The modern MDA concept traces its roots from the consequences of the  
September 11 attacks in the U.S. by the Islamist terrorist groups and the unexpected surge 
in information technology.18 Homeland security focus would become entrenched in the 
MDA concept, which would set in motion a series of interagency and multinational 
collaborations and the development of MDA fusion centers all around the world. One 
successful model for achieving effective MDA in a collaborative environment that the new 
 
13 Timothy J. Doorey, “Maritime Domain Awareness,” in In Global Responses to Maritime Violence: 
Cooperation and Collective Action, ed. Paul Shemella (Stanford University Press, 2016), 126. 
14 Doorey, 127. 
15 According to UNCLOS, the EEZ gives a state exclusive rights to marine and mineral resources 
found within the designated zone. Source: “UNCLOS, Article 55” (1994), 40, 
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm. 
16 Tsailas Demetrios, “War On The Exclusive Economic Zone,” Strategy International (blog), March 
18, 2012, https://strategyinternational.org/war-exclusive-economic-zone/. 
17 Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU). 
18 Andrew Metrick and Kathleen H. Hicks, “Contested Seas: Maritime Domain Awareness in 




MDA centers attempted to copy is the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF South). 
It is an organization that brought together international, federal, state, and local actors for 
interdicting illicit maritime drug trafficking, primarily cocaine, in the Caribbean basin. 
JIATF-South carries “the gold standard” for interagency cooperation, and it has been often 
mentioned in written works on interagency collaboration using a whole-of-government 
approach.19 However, this trend led to MDA’s dominant practice that focuses heavily on 
civil and law enforcement elements in the maritime domain. Metric and Hicks pointed out 
that “a weakness of this modern MDA concept is that many of the associated capabilities 
and frameworks have been focused on civil maritime issues instead of warfighting 
functions.”20 Despite this shortcoming, there is now an ongoing thrust for a comprehensive 
MDA that brings back the military requirements that have been lost in a civil maritime 
focused MDA system.21 With the resurgence of great power competition, especially in a 
highly contested region such as the SCS, this development in the MDA proves to be timely. 
According to the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO), 
“MDA is not a particular mission or task, but rather the result of the proper integration of 
a diverse set of capabilities, which provide decision-makers with an effective 
understanding of the maritime domain.”22 MDA is a vital part of a nation’s security 
strategy, which is difficult to achieve. According to Doorey, achieving comprehensive 
maritime domain awareness will always be more of a goal than an obtainable objective, 
and he provided the following fundamental building blocks for governments to enhance 
their MDA:  
1. Limited Scope for MDA efforts. Most countries do not have sufficient monitoring 
capabilities to cover their entire areas of responsibility (AORs). Governments must 
 
19 Evan Munsing and Christopher J Lamb, “Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, 
Least Understood Interagency Success,” National Defense University Press, June 2011, 117, 1, 
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-5.pdf. 
20 Metrick and Hicks, “Contested Seas,” v. 
21 Metrick and Hicks, 15. 
22 National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO), “National Concept of Operations for 
Maritime Domain Awareness” (National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO), December 
2007), 6, https://nmio.ise.gov/Portals/16/Docs/071213mdaconops.pdf?ver=2015-12-04-123515-657. 
10 
therefore prioritize where to concentrate their limited resources so that they have a deeper 
understanding of their most vulnerable areas of responsibility and extend their coverage to 
define a manageable area of interest (AOI), the area from where their maritime threats 
originate prior to entering their AORs. In short, governments must identify their MDA gaps 
and do their best to fill those gaps with the available resources on hand. Also, having 
identified the gaps and shortfalls in MDA, governments will know how to get assistance 
from other governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, regional partners, or 
allied countries.  
2. Interagency and Multinational Approaches. Current maritime challenges pose 
risks over countries relying on shared maritime commons for growth and continuity. This 
shared reality provides tremendous opportunities to advance interagency collaboration and 
multinational cooperation on MDA and other maritime security issues. 
3. Mix of High and Low Technology. Governments should not hesitate to use 
advanced technologies for MDA. Most state-of-the-art technologies are readily available 
and reasonably priced in the commercial sector. However, these MDA technologies should 
complement simple MDA systems (i.e., human networks) to exchange information and to 
observe more of the maritime domain. 
4. Common Reporting Standards for Contacts of Interest. Governments should 
strive to standardize MDA reporting formats and procedures among agencies and regional 
partners. A standardized reporting system is critical for the real-time and detailed 
dissemination of MDA information to decision-makers. It will increase speed and reduce 
error rates, especially among partners without a shared language. 
5. Training and Education. MDA requires a highly trained workforce to do what is 
necessary to collect, collate, analyze, and disseminate information to concerned agencies 
and decision-makers in a timely manner. The senior workforce should also be highly 
educated to prepare them for dynamic circumstances and assist with interagency and 
regional efforts to adopt new technologies and enhance information-sharing agreements. 
11 
Therefore, MDA organizations must have a well-established education and training system 
in order for them to be efficient and effective.23 
MDA can be broken down into two components—Maritime Intelligence and 
Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA). According to Cheng, “Maritime intelligence is 
the integration of all available information to identify, locate, and track potential threats in 
the maritime, while maritime situational awareness is the persistent monitoring of the 
maritime domain.”24 The intelligence gathered in the maritime space is shared among 
interagency and regional partners in the maritime domain. 
The Philippine Navy defines MSA as “the comprehensive knowledge obtained 
from all-source information systems, continuous and integrated data collection, and 
information exchanges relating to [the] maritime domain and other allied operating 
domains to support decision-making.”25 MSA contributes to MDA national effort by 
promptly providing information to stakeholders on what is observable, known, and 
anticipated in the maritime domain.  
MDA and MSA may seem similar in undertakings, but they have different 
meanings and it is often confusing for agencies to know which term to use and how. As 
has been laid out earlier, MDA is a broader term that centers on all matters connected to 
the maritime domain. In contrast, Bueger explains that “MSA emphasizes space and time 
(situations) and is hence more oriented towards operations, incidents, real-time analysis, 
and rapid reactions.”26 MSA focuses more on the understanding of what is taking place at 
sea. Put simply, MDA is a broader concept that includes MSA. With the above insights, 
this research opted to use the term MDA Situational Awareness to simplify definitions.  
 
23 Doorey, “Maritime Domain Awareness.” 
24 Dean Cheng, “The Importance of Maritime Domain Awareness for the Indo–Pacific Quad 
Countries” (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, March 6, 2019): 2, 
https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/the-importance-maritime-domain-awareness-the-indo-
pacific-quad-countries. 
25 Philippine Navy, email message to author, September 8, 2020. 
26 Christian Bueger, “From Dusk to Dawn? Maritime Domain Awareness in Southeast Asia,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 37, no. 2 (August 31, 2015): 160, https://doi.org/10.1355/cs37-2a. 
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The tasks that support MDA situational awareness falls into four broad categories 
(Figure 2). These performance tasks are usually in this sequence and are part of a repetitive 
process, varying depending on the situation. MDA situational awareness involves the 
collection, fusion, analysis, and dissemination of data and information. Notice that the 
process starts with “observables.” One must also understand that there are “non-
observables” such as financial transactions, communications among bad actors, human 
networks, and many more. Intelligence gathered on non-observables can play an essential 
role in MDA analysis and should be incorporated whenever possible. 
 
Figure 2. MDA situational awareness cycle.27 
According to Andrew Metrick and Kathleen Hicks, “Collection refers to gathering 
raw data on the maritime domain to include subsurface, surface, and aerial targets of 
interests.”28  NMIO disclosed that “data and information may come from routine 
surveillance operations and sensors, cued intelligence sensors and sources, open-source 
publications, archived databases, or reports from members of the maritime community.”29 
 
27 Timothy J. Doorey, email message to author, February 28, 2020. 
28 Metrick and Hicks, “Contested Seas,” 2. 
29 National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office, “National Concept of Operations for Maritime 
Domain Awareness,” 7. 
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The span of coverage that a network of collection sensors can provide is crucial in 
determining the effectiveness of the sensors.30 
Data fusion combines data or information from the collection of assets.31 This 
analysis creates a common operating picture (COP) to derive a greater awareness of the 
maritime domain’s state. This process usually entails using computer-assisted analysis 
programs to transform data and information into usable intelligence for decision-makers. 
A determining factor in the analytic structure capabilities is if it can effectively integrate 
extensive sensor inputs to produce applicable intelligence. 
Dissemination is the method of providing actionable intelligence to relevant 
platforms, agencies, and other decision-making bodies in a timely manner.32 This 
dissemination of information and data goes through a network infrastructure with multi-
level security access. For a dissemination network infrastructure to be adequate, the system 
must relay critical information throughout the whole spectrum of warfare. 
B. POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
The Philippines have adopted several policies and strategies, reinforcing the need 
to develop the necessary capabilities to preserve its maritime sovereignty. 
1. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 
The highest law of the land provides the mandate of the AFP as “protector of the 
people and the State” directed “to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of 
the national territory (Article II, Section 3).”33 Additionally, the law also underscores that 
“the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally 
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the 
 
30 Metrick and Hicks, “Contested Seas,” 2. 
31 Metrick and Hicks, 3. 
32 Metrick and Hicks, 3. 
33 The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines (1987), 
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/. 
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policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations (Article 
II, Section 2).”34 
2. National Marine Policy 
The Philippines adopted a policy showcasing an integrated strategy for managing 
and developing its marine resource in 1994.35 One of its key policy areas is maritime 
security. This pillar involves securing the country’s maritime assets and zones to protect 
the Philippines as a nation from all threats, external or internal. It emphasizes that the key 
to maritime security is the modernization of the government’s armed forces by investing 
in more robust marine vessels. It also includes information and communication technology 
upgrades to respond to the government forces’ demands and the citizens involved in marine 
protection and security. A review of this policy in 2016 revealed the need to strengthen the 
security of the archipelagic sea lanes and EEZs from illegal fishing and poaching. The 
review recommended that sufficient resources be made available to naval and coastal 
services for constant monitoring and evaluation of security activities in the maritime 
domain. 
3. National Security Policy 2017−2022 
The National Security Policy (NSP) reiterates the preservation and protection of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity as one of the pillars of national security.36 Moreover, 
it declares territorial integrity as one of the national security interests and emphasizes its 
sovereign rights exercise over its 200 nautical miles EEZ. Relatedly, it considers the 
dispute over the WPS as one of the primary national security challenges. In light of the 
favorable July 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling, the country will treat 
 
34 The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 
35 Edna Co, Mark Anthony Gamboa, and Michael Eric Castillo, “National Marine Policy Review and 
Strategic Direction: Review and Update of the 1994 National Marine Policy and the Formulation of the 
National Marine Strategy,” Public Policy Journal 21, no. 1 (2016), 1. 
36 National Security Council, National Security Policy 2017–2022 (Manila: Official Gazette of the 
Republic of the Philippines, 2017), https://www.nsc.gov.ph/attachments/article/NSP/NSP-2017-2022.pdf. 
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this sensitive issue with caution to avoid potential armed conflicts and rally international 
support for a rules-based approach and the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling.    
4. National Security Strategy 2018 
The preservation of sovereignty and national territorial integrity is one of the core 
interests of the National Security Strategy (NSS).37 It also articulated bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations as channels to solve disputes. Significantly, the NSS also laid 
down the use of the following relevant instruments of national power: political and legal 
tools to pursue a rules-based approach in defending the country’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity; a diplomatic mechanism to enhance foreign relations in pursuit of shared 
interests; an intelligence instrument to include counterintelligence to deny the enemy’s 
collection efforts; and a  military and law enforcement instrument to protect the country 
from foreign threat and aggression. Further, the NSS involves the enhancement of the 
Philippines’ maritime domain awareness. 
5. The National Baselines Law 
On March 10, 2009, Republic Act No. 9522 was signed into law to amend the 
previous laws that define the Philippines’ archipelagic baseline.38 The establishment of the 
new archipelagic baselines serves as a basis for the Philippines’ maritime and economic 
jurisdiction consistent with UNCLOS and international law. It also incorporated the 
Kalayaan Group of Islands and Scarborough Shoal in the West Philippine Sea under the 
Philippines’ sovereignty. Vietnam and China manifested submitted a diplomatic protest on 
this act. 
 
37 National Security Council, National Security Strategy (Manila: Official Gazette of the Republic of 
the Philippines, 2018), https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2018/08aug/20180802-national-
security-strategy.pdf. 
38 Republic Act No. 9522 (Manila: Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 2009), 
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2009/03/10/republic-act-no-9522/. 
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6. Executive Order No. 57 
On September 6, 2011, the National Coast Watch System (NCWS) was established, 
which serves as the “central-interagency mechanism for a coordinated and coherent 
approach to national maritime issues and maritime security operations towards enhancing 
governance in the country’s maritime domain.39 The system comprises three organs: 
National Coast Watch Council is considered the brain of the system, National Coast Watch 
Secretariat is the hand or policy pusher, and the National Coast Watch Center is the leg or 
the operating arm of the system.40 The NCW Center serves as the operating arm of the 
NCWS in charge of implementing and coordinating maritime security operations following 
the strategic direction and policy guidance issued by the Council. Its operational 
requirements in particular for maritime situational awareness and maritime security 
response is supported by the PN, Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police 
Maritime Group (PNP-MG), Bureau of Customs (BOC), Bureau of Immigration (BI), 
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), National Bureau of Investigation 
(NBI), Philippine Center on Transnational Crimes (PCTC), National Prosecution Service 
of the Department of Justice, and other maritime security stakeholders. 
7. National Military Strategy 2019 
The National Military Strategy (NMS) addresses both external and internal threats 
simultaneously without losing focus on the AFP’s primary mandate - the defense of the 
country’s territory, sovereignty, government, and the Filipino people.41 Its strategic 
approaches include the whole-of-nation approach, alliance leveraging, joint forces 
development, and strategic flexibility in conventional and unconventional means to 
confront various threats. 
 
39 Executive Order No. 57 (Manila: Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 2011), 
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2011/09sep/20110906-EO-0057-BSA.pdf. 
40 Carmelo Inocando, email message to author, April 16, 2020. 
41 Juan Celebrado, email message to author, September 23, 2020. 
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8. Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy 2017 
With the strategic goal of securing sovereignty, defending territorial integrity, and 
protecting maritime interests, the Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy (AADS) guides 
naval forces’ employment in joint, combined, and inter-agency operations.42 This strategy 
is anchored on three mutually strategic approaches: Maritime Operations (MO), Maritime 
Cooperation (MC), and Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA). Relevant naval 
operational tasks include engaging stakeholders and maritime agencies, increasing the 
capacities of Philippine Navy Auxiliary Reserve Units (PNARU) and line reserves as force 
multipliers, integrating and mobilizing naval reserves, and employing forces for 
asymmetric warfare. Significantly, the AADS identifies the WPS as a priority area for 
MSA. 
C. EXTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Due to existing territorial disputes and an upsurge of maritime encounters in the 
SCS, the Philippines’ security environment’s characteristics mostly involve increasing 
tensions among the Indo-Pacific region’s leading players. The 2020 Congressional 
Research Service report even says that “in an international security environment described 
as one of renewed great power competition, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an 
arena of U.S.-China strategic competition.”43 Both countries are striving to bolster their 
alliances and influence in the region. Amidst the great power competition between the U.S. 
and China, more freedom of navigation and overflight operations (FONOPS) have been 
taking place along the WPS to support open Indo-Pacific advocacy. Larter mentioned in 
his article for the DefenseNews that “the U.S. Navy conducted more freedom of navigation 
operations in 2019 than in any year since the U.S. began more aggressively challenging 
China’s claims in the South China Sea in 2015.”44 
 
42 Jofel Besa, email message to author, September 27, 2020. 
43 “Report on U.S.-China Competition in East, South China Sea,” USNI News (blog), February 4, 
2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/02/04/report-on-u-s-china-competition-in-east-south-china-sea. 
44 David Larter, “In Challenging China’s Claims in the South China Sea, the U.S. Navy Is Getting 
More Assertive,” Defense News, February 18, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/02/05/in-
challenging-chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea-the-us-navy-is-getting-more-assertive/. 
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China’s current militarization activities in its reclaimed islands in the WPS pose a 
severe threat to the Philippines. It is also the most prominent issue for the AFP since PLAN 
military capabilities are continually developing and increasing. Its proximity to the 
Philippine western coast’s territorial baselines would be able to target the country within 
its potential striking radius.45 Moreover, China’s aggressive stance in the region triggered 
the development of defense capabilities among other neighboring regional states. In July 
2014, Japan revised the Constitution’s interpretation that finally allowed them to apply the 
right of collective self-defense.46 This move enabled Japan to develop its capabilities 
against external invasion. Taiwan has stepped up its defense capacity in becoming more 
“self-sufficient” by developing a more independent defense industry.47 Vietnam procured 
submarines from Russia to enhance its deterrence capacity. With 6 Kilo-class submarines 
in its current inventory, the Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN) is the most formidable 
submarine force among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).48 In 2009, 
Vietnam also launched its maritime militia for sovereignty protection and economic 
development. However, lacking a grand strategy for coordination, the Vietnam maritime 
militia could only enlist 1% of Vietnam’s registered fleet.49 Malaysia is increasing its 
defense spending to enhance defense readiness, especially in improving the mobility of the 
armed forces.50 On the other hand,  Indonesia is looking to establish or expand military 
 
45 Celebrado, email message to author. 
46 Sean Mirski, “A Primer on Japan’s Constitutional Reinterpretation and Right to Collective Self-
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Benar News, October 11, 2019, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/malaysian/new-budget-
10112019154919.html. 
19 
bases in its sovereign maritime waters in or adjacent to the South China Sea to guard its 
national interest and protect its sovereignty in the SCS.51  
Aligned with the region’s defense capability developments are the rampant illicit 
activities occurring in the WPS, which significantly affect maritime security. Illegal fishing 
in the EEZ dramatically affects the oceans’ health and the Philippine fisherfolks’ economic 
development. Illegal fishers from Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, and other regional 
neighbors enter the Philippine EEZ with more sophisticated fishing equipment, which gives 
them the advantage of greater fish yield.52 Another widespread illicit activity in the WPS 
that has a detrimental impact on the economy due to its high number of occurrences is 
poaching. Roughly 71,400 metric tons of captured fisheries, with an estimated PHP7.1 
billion value, are lost every year to poaching.53 
D. THE CHINA CHALLENGE 
There is a need to review China’s interest and its strategies that paved the way for 
its considerable success in its advances in the WPS. 
1. China’s Interest in the South China Sea 
 According to Sigfrido Burgos Caceres, China’s interest in the SCS is driven by 
three interrelated factors: prosperity (economic wealth), power, and security.54 Financial 
wealth translates to power, power ensures security, and security provides opportunities for 
more wealth and more power. The need to sustain its accelerated economic growth and to 
provide for the domestic needs of its large population base is the leading cause of China’s 
interest in the South China Sea. The preservation and projection of power is another factor 
driving China’s interest in the SCS. Caceres stated that the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) is credited with advancing the people’s economic prospects, which leads to 
 
51 Zachary Keck, “Indonesia Is Building New Military Base in South China Sea” (The Center for the 
National Interest, July 10, 2015), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/indonesia-building-new-
military-base-south-china-sea-13305. 
52 Co, Gamboa, and Castillo, “National Marine Policy Review,” 37. 
53 Co, Gamboa, and Castillo, 37. 
54 Sigfrido Burgos Cáceres, China’s Strategic Interests in the South China Sea: Power and Resources 
(New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 1, https://b-ok.cc/book/2361665/a0169f. 
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stability.55 Therefore, the preservation of the CCP is crucial in keeping the populace 
contented to prevent mass revolts and civil unrest that may threaten the regime. Fully 
realizing that domestic power preservation and prosperity are closely intertwined, the 
Politburo Standing Committee implemented a plan in March 2011 to maintain popular 
support by pursuing economic growth and prosperity, which translates to employment, 
income, and a comfortable life for its populace.56 Having attained superpower status, China 
must also fortify its influence at the regional and international level by projecting its foreign 
and economic policies with its strong military backing. China’s foreign policy is geared 
toward securing new sources of energy and protecting current sources. Caceres claims that 
“resource security takes on a more pragmatic approach, one that hinges on the deployment 
of Chinese state-owned enterprises and government agencies in search of inputs that can 
be secured, processed, and transported where they are needed.”57  The rich resources of 
the SCS will sustain China’s economic growth, which will uphold its power in both 
domestic and international settings. The last factor that is pushing China’s interest in the 
SCS is security. The SCS is the gateway for China to access the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 
which is vital for its import and export economy. Securing the SCS for its economic interest 
will drive China’s prosperity. From a military standpoint, China also considers the SCS as 
a critical vulnerability and desires to fortify it against potential adversaries. As part of its 
deterrence strategy against U.S. military operations in the SCS, China implemented its 
compelling anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) defense capabilities.58 
2. Chinese Strategies in the South China Sea 
 China’s national priorities show its assertion and its strengthening position in its 
maritime territories in the SCS. In achieving this goal, O’Rourke said that “China appears 
to be employing an integrated, whole-of-society strategy that includes diplomatic, 
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informational, economic, military, paramilitary/law enforcement, and civilian elements.”59 
Table 1 shows an overview of China’s perceived goals complemented with the ongoing 
support actions in SCS. It is evident from the table that China has fully integrated a system 
that maximizes all three sea forces to establish control over its claimed nine-dash line. The 
process addresses both internal and external threats that may arise in their campaign to 
control the South China Sea. 
Table 1. China’s Apparent Goals and Supporting Actions for the South 








Intimidate neighbors and 
encourage appeasement/ 
compliance 
PLA operations a x x x 
China Coast Guard 
operations b 
x x x 
Maritime militia 
swarming 
  x 
Dredging fleet and island 
construction team 
operations c 
x x x 
a. Includes military exercises, weapons tests, port visits, patrols throughout the SCS, 
military parades, and echelon formation participation.  
b. Includes deployment of large vessels and participation in echelon formation.  
c. Includes large-scale dredging and island-building, and construction of permanent 
facilities on disputed features.  
 
a. Anti- Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) 
MDAA describes A2/AD as an “attempt to deny an adversary’s freedom of 
movement on the battlefield.”61 As part of its anti-access measures, China uses ballistic 
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and cruise missiles with ranges of 1,500 km to 800km. These weapons can be fielded on 
land reclamations in the SCS, and it can also be fielded aboard warships, aircraft, and 
submarines. China’s area denial in the SCS region depends on its fighter jets, 
complemented by a sophisticated air and missile defense system. These defense platforms 
are usually acquired from Russia, but some have been produced locally. This strategy of 
the PLA is to “advance its capacity to integrate sensors and long-range precision strike 
assets to defend against perceived threats to national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.”62 
b. Chinese Coast Guards (CCG) 
As part of defending territorial claims in the region, there has been an ongoing trend 
in the Southeast Asia region to develop and expand coast guard vessels. Morris explains 
that “this shift is driven in part by a perception among regional policymakers that coast 
guards offer a less militaristic face of state power in disputed maritime areas, as well as by 
a presumption that coast guards demonstrate that the dispute in question is under domestic 
civilian jurisdiction, subject to domestic laws and regulations.”63 Andrew S Erickson, 
Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst revealed that China is aggressively increasing its maritime 
capability to be the world’s largest coastguard and largest overall maritime law-
enforcement forces in the world.64 Dubbed as China’s second sea force, CCG will continue 
to enhance its capacity so that the PLAN can focus more on its missions farther out to sea. 
With its formidable armaments, the CCG vessels are predominantly enforcing aggressive 
tactics as it carries out maritime law-enforcement activities over its claimed territory in the 
SCS. The Chinese Coast Guard will grow in size, but new platforms’ acquisition will also 
emphasize speed rather than just size. With its disputed established territorial waters in the 
SCS region, China will be prioritizing these claims’ security enforcement measures. CCG 
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will be utilized regularly to perform enforcement surveillance operations throughout these 
maritime claims.65 
c. Maritime Militias in Gray Zone Operations 
 The addition of the Chinese Maritime Militia is challenging the existing rules of 
engagement in the maritime domain. It is also endangering the safety of all vessels 
navigating through international waters. The Director of Asia Maritime Transparency 
Initiative Gregory Poling said that “the next violent incident to take place in the South 
China Sea is far more likely to involve the Chinese militia than the PLA or China Coast 
Guard, and it will lack the mechanisms for communication and de-escalation that exist 
between those professional services and their counterparts in other nations.”66 Maritime 
militias have been a force to contend with in the disputed waters of SCS. They have been 
known to engage in several international sea incidents since 2009.  
According to Morris, “Maritime militia characterizes fishermen and crew of 
civilian ships who receive military training or are under some type of military command 
and control arrangement and who carry out military support activities aboard fishing 
vessels when required.”67 Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson have branded these 
maritime militias as China’s Third Sea Force and have referred to these irregular forces as 
the “People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).”68 Their extensive research from 
Chinese-language open sources reveals that significant maritime militias activities are 
coordinated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S 
Erickson declared that “the militia has a military organizational structure and, despite being 
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a separate component of China’s armed forces, is organized and commanded directly by 
the PLA’s local military commands.”69 
Ganadillo posits that “gray zone maritime strategy employs hybrid warfare, in 
which the lines between military, economic, diplomatic, and intelligence means of 
aggression are blurred.”70  Ivy Ganadillo also found that “actors in grey zone strategy 
break, ignore, and diminish the rules-based international order and upend established rules 
of conventional conflict, making the rules of engagement (ROEs) unclear.”71 Brooks added 
that “gray-zone actors deliberately exploit these uncertainties to evade legal responsibility 
and minimize military, economic, and political consequences.”72 In the context of the SCS, 
the delineation separating civilians and the military are indistinct, making rules-of-
engagement (ROE) ambiguous. This strategy is demonstrated by the CCG patrolling the 
reclaimed islands in the disputed water and the PAFMM vessels that utilize near-collision 
tactics to veer off unauthorized vessels. These PAFMM vessels present themselves as a 
commercial fishing fleet undertaking naval operations for the PLA while at the same time 
hiding under a civilian cover where the military can deny participation. This cover is an 
attribute of the gray zone operation that places other adversaries at a disadvantage. These 
fishing vessels are not gray hulls (color of military vessels), which is why PAFMM 
employment remains below the threshold of conflict.   
With the Chinese regular force and irregular force employing irregular tactics in 
the disputed waters of SCS, a form of hybrid warfare comes to mind. Hybrid warfare blends 
all types of forces in a battlespace, a characteristic that is also present in gray zone 
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operations. However, the difference between the two is that they are located in different 
conflict spectrum positions (see Figure 3). Hybrid warfare holds a position on the spectrum 
within higher conflict levels, making it distinct from gray zone activities.73  In the context 
of the SCS dispute, the distinction between hybrid warfare and gray zone operations can 
be surmised from the military’s role in the conflict and how far a state actor is willing to 
utilize them. The operation of the military in gray zone scenarios is often relegated to a 
deterrence role. A classic example is during CCG and PAFMM operations in the SCS, 
where the PLAN is somewhere in the vicinity to ensure that any adversary will deeply 
evaluate the use of force against China’s second and third sea forces. If this were to be a 
form of hybrid warfare, the PLAN would also be engaging, and the situation will have 
passed the threshold of armed conflict. 
 
Phase 0, Phase 1: Shape and 
Deter 
Phase 2–5: Seize the Initiative, Dominate, 
Stabilize, Enable Civilian Authority 















Figure 3. The spectrum of warfare, overlaid with the U.S. Department of 
Defense Operational Planning Phases for Combat Operations.74 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COUNTERACTIONS 
Several foreign and local experts have given their thoughts on how the Philippines 
can challenge China’s gray zone operations in the WPS. The AMTI Director, Gregory 
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Poling, recommended strengthening the alliance between the U.S. and the Philippines for 
deterrence purposes.75 Collin Koh of Nanyang Technological University in Singapore 
suggested that the Philippines should maintain a visible presence and reinforce its maritime 
forces in the area.76 With these factors in place, the Philippines can monitor and record all 
Chinese activities, which would serve as evidence during a diplomatic protest.  
Alexander Neil of the International Institute for Strategic Studies suggests the 
publication of Chinese activities in the WPS. This report includes coercion activities 
against Filipino fisherfolk and the broadcasts of Chinese maritime militia transmissions. 
Neil also suggested the placement of weapons systems in Pag-asa Island to deter Chinese 
encroachment. The Philippines’ concern in this region should continuously be raised in 
international fora, backed up by figures and images. An informed international community 
can be united in emphasizing that China should adhere to a rules-based international 
system, especially with the Arbitration Ruling of 2016.77  
Jay Batongbacal, a Philippine maritime expert, recommended for the continued 
protest to China’s action. Batongbacal asserted that China “should be continuously 
monitored, and the government should always make public the number and activities of 
militia vessels, especially if they engage in illegitimate activities within Philippine 
waters.”78 It is anticipated that China’s continuous pressure would lead to negotiations that 
can lay the ground rules for conduct in the region. 
Another local analyst, Ganadillo, asserts that PAFMM’s deceptive activities should 
be documented and exposed in various regional and international forums, emphasizing 
international law violations.79 At the operational level, Ganadillo recommends the 
following: increase PCG patrols; reinforce troops in KIG detachments; utilize allies to 
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improve maritime domain awareness, information sharing, and diplomatic coordination; 
and conduct joint patrols and exercises.  
F. SYNTHESIS 
China sees the SCS as both a critical requirement and a critical vulnerability that 
needs to be managed. Given this, China’s national interest drives them to employ both 
conventional and unconventional WPS measures, disregarding the international rules-based 
system. Such measures manifest themselves in gray zone operations by the PAFMM with 
the backing of CCG and PLAN. China has paved the way to exert authority on its territorial 
claim by using civilian vessels and personnel to avert a military confrontation. Because of 
the ambiguity of the PAFMM in its relation to a military organization, China can easily 
refute any insinuation of gray zone activities hurled at them. Through gray zone operations, 
China can continuously pursue its illegal reclamation of WPS features and allow its fishing 
fleet to overexploit marine resources in the surrounding waters.  
The Philippines is aware that there is an ongoing great power competition in this 
contested region. That is why, under the current administration, the Philippines pursued an 
independent foreign policy that creates a new partnership with all nations.80 According to 
its domestic laws and policies, the Philippines’ policy points to resolving maritime disputes 
through peaceful means. However, the Philippines also views the gradual militarization of 
China’s reclaimed features in the WPS as a severe strategic threat due to its potential striking 
proximity if a full-blown armed conflict occurs. Even if a full-scale armed conflict is 
doubtful in the future, China is more likely to continue to exploit gray zone operations to 
ensure that it retains its superiority over the region. As a deterrent measure, the Philippines 
started to build up its naval and coastguard capabilities to enforce its maritime sovereignty. 
With the apparent differences in military strength between the Philippines and China, most 
recommendations in addressing China’s aggression do not point to a military approach. 
Instead, it has been dominantly recommended to expose China’s gray zone tactics before 
international and regional fora. Some advocate the use of media to counter China’s narrative 
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that it is only protecting its sovereignty. The establishment of the NCWS is an excellent 
start to integrate all maritime agencies for maritime security awareness. However, NCWS 
is yet to prove that it can rally all maritime law enforcement agencies toward a whole-of-
government approach for Philippine maritime security.81 
These recommendations and initiatives point to the Philippines’ need to enhance its 
maritime situational awareness system to monitor and record Chinese activities in the WPS. 
The next chapter will now look into the PNMSAS to see its capabilities and how it can be 
enhanced.  
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III. PHILIPPINE NAVY MARITIME SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS SYSTEM 
The strategic goal of MSA is to ensure that real-time information is readily 
available to enable effective decision-making for maritime operations to support national 
and regional cooperation in the maritime domain. It can also support diplomatic initiatives. 
The PNMSAS is the organized or established procedure of collecting all source 
information through sensors and intelligence operations to establish and maintain a 
Common Operating Picture (COP) in the maritime environment.82 It is a network of 
maritime surveillance platforms and observation posts installed at critical locations: sea 
lines of communication (SLOCS); maritime chokepoints, international and domestic 
shipping routes, terrorist and smuggling routes; and other strategic areas. Generally called 
Maritime Situational Awareness Platforms (MSAP), these observation posts can be 
categorized as follows: Littoral Monitoring Stations (LMS), Littoral Monitoring 
Detachment (LMD), Naval Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (NA-
ISR), and Naval Surface Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (NA-ISR). The 
PNMSAS provides 24-hour surveillance using sensors and visual monitoring aboard the 
different Littoral Monitoring Stations and PN ships and aircraft located or deployed in 
strategic areas throughout the country. 
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Before the formal establishment of the PNMSAS, the Philippine Navy, through its 
intelligence units, had already formed a system of monitoring the nation’s extensive 
coastline by getting information on watercraft and aircraft sightings from locals residing in 
the coastal areas. Collectively known as “Coast Watchers,” this human intelligence 
(HUMINT) network laid the groundwork for developing the Philippine coast watch 
system. This HUMINT network, however, lacks a system that can verify, confirm, or 
establish patterns of reported sightings. As such, the information gathered cannot serve as 
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a basis for adopting national policies. Furthermore, sightings were relayed through an 
obsolete telegraphic system making it difficult to achieve timely and effective monitoring. 
With the advent of the AFP Modernization program, the PN gradually shifted to 
external defense by focusing on higher security threats through selective sea control. To 
support this strategic shift, the PN launched the Project Coast Watch on March 22, 1995. 
The project was led by the Naval Intelligence and Security Force (NISF) with the initial 
activation of three Littoral Observation Stations (LOS) in Zamboanga, Palawan, and 
Samar. The PN activated two more LOS in Zambales and Batangas areas by 1998. From 
2000 to 2005, PN started three more LOS in northern Palawan, the Spratly Islands, and 
Davao. Each of these eight LOS eventually formed the original Project Coast Watch. 
The Coast Watch South (CWS) 83 project came into being under the Department of 
National Defense Orders Number 36, dated November 29, 2006. According to Angel 
Rabasa and Peter Chalk, the project is “intended to be an interagency effort involving the 
Philippine Navy (PN), Philippine National Police (PNP), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), 
the National Anti-Terrorism Task Force, the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, 
the Bureau of Customs, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, the Bureau of 
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, the Bureau of Quarantine and Health Services, the 
Philippine Ports Authority, and the Maritime Industry Authority.”84 These agencies had 
directives to operationalize the CWS project towards a national maritime inter-agency 
surveillance system under the National Coast Watch Council. The United States and 
Australia gave support to this inter-agency collaboration. However, due to the level of 
maritime threats in the Southern Philippines and limited resources, the PN was directed to 
focus on Mindanao and Southern Palawan, which led to the term Coast Watch South. 
On March 18, 2013, the PN renamed the Coast Watch project as the Philippine 
Navy Maritime Situational Awareness System. To align itself with the PN’s operational 
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strategy, PNMSAS has integrated the capability of PN ships, aircraft, and marine units as 
a network of mobile sensors. With the PN serving as one of the National Coast Watch 
System’s supporting agencies, PNMSAS also serves as the PN’s link to the National Coast 
Watch Center (NCWC). 
On March 3, 2016, the LOS were renamed Littoral Monitoring Stations (LMS). The 
PN also reactivated the LMSs in Ayungin, Tinaca, and Zamboanga, and LMDs in Bolinao, 
Batan, Likas, Lawak, Kota, Parola, Quezon, Taytay, and Surigao. 
On July 14, 2016, the administration of all LMS communication, equipment, and 
information systems (CEIS), except for LMS Ayungin in the Spratly Islands, was 
transferred to the Naval Information and Communication Technology Center (NICTC). 
This transfer was executed to address the LMS’s mounting technological requirements to 
sustain optimal performance. Moreover, the manning and training of LMS CEIS personnel 
have also been delegated to NICTC. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The Maritime Research Information Center (MRIC) was activated in December 
2008 to “administer the Philippine Navy Maritime Situational Awareness System and 
provide maritime information to support the Philippine Navy in accomplishing its 
mission.”85 MRIC is the unit primarily responsible for collecting, processing, analyzing, 
and producing maritime intelligence to the headquarters of the Philippine Navy (HPN).  
The functions of MRIC as the administrator of PNMSAS are as follows: 
1. Provide maritime intelligence to national, strategic, operational, tactical, 
and inter-agency end-users to support interception and subsequent 
operations; 
2. Develop, operate, and maintain a maritime-related information database; 
and 
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3. Maintain linkages with local and international agencies and academic 
stakeholders on maritime-related concerns86 
MRIC has administrative and operational control of five Maritime Situational 
Awareness Centers (MSAC), as shown in Figure 4. The MSAC also has operational control 
of the different information collection platforms manned by Maritime Surveillance Teams 
(MST) aboard LMS, PN ships, PN aircraft, other maritime agencies, and other assets, 
which are found in respective Maritime Reporting Areas (MRA) within a given area of 
operation. MRIC, through MSAC, has operational control of LMS. NICTC, on the other 
hand, has administrative control in terms of the manning, repair, maintenance, and 
sustainment of CEIS equipment aboard LMS. MSAC also provides personnel to augment 





Figure 4. Disposition of MSACs in the different Naval Operating Force 
(NOF) areas87 
MRIC serves as an information fusion center by providing strategic and national 
assessments to national level agencies such as the National Task Force on the West 
Philippine Sea, the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, and the Naval Operations 
Center. MSACs provide maritime domain information not only to MRIC but also to 
regional hubs such as the Naval Task Forces (NTF), Naval Operating Forces (NOF), and 
Unified Commands (UC). The core functions of MSACs are as follows: 
1. Gather, consolidate and synthesize data from the different LMS, PN vessels, 
PN vessels, PN aircraft, and other sources of information for the use of 
NOFs; 





3. Conduct periodic assessments of maritime security in its area of 
responsibility; 
4. Act as the regional hub for maritime data collection and the primary data 
reporting unit to the Naval Intelligence and Security Force (NISF) with 
timely and periodic intervals; 
5. Develop and maintain effective communication and information systems to 
enhance regional inter-agency coordination and cooperation; 
6. Assist the NOF in the planning, coordination, monitoring, evaluation, 
documentation, and reporting on the conduct of maritime security 
operations in its area of responsibility; and 
7. Disseminate information to NOF and other maritime stakeholders about the 
maritime security picture in its area of responsibility.88 
C. INFORMATION COLLECTION CAPABILITIES 
The existing information collection capabilities of the PNMSAS are land-
based/shore-based sensors composed of the Littoral Monitoring Stations spread throughout 
the archipelago, and mobile sensors consisting of the PN vessels, PN aircraft, a maritime 
unmanned aerial system, and a 28-meter tethered aerostat. 
1. Land-Based Sensors 
The Littoral Monitoring Stations are the frontlines of operations in terms of MSA. 
They are equipped with the essential CEIS equipment such as RADAR (with or without an 
EO-IR camera), AIS Receiver, Radio Direction Finder (RDF), binoculars, high-frequency 
communications equipment, VHF marine band, and Very Small Aperture Terminal 





Figure 5. Disposition of LMS with detection coverage.89 
The LMS gathers information from two primary sources: sensors and human 
intelligence (HUMINT). The sensors refer to the CEIS equipment, while the HUMINT 
refers to PN assets, Filipino Fishing Boats (FFB), merchant vessels, pleasure craft, and 
assets of local government units (LGU).  
2. Mobile Sensors 
These are the PN ships and PN aircraft that have the same CEIS equipment found 
in LMS. These mobile platforms enable the maximization of resources because they can 




is that they can readily transform from information collection missions to maritime threat 
responders when the needs arise. Part of the aerial MSA platform inventory is a 28m Class 
Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS), provided by the U.S. government.90 The aerostat 
can rise up to an altitude of 5,000 feet while anchored to the ground, and it can provide 
maritime surveillance of up to 90 miles from its position. 
These land-based and mobile sensors contributed immensely to detecting foreign 
vessel incursion in the Philippines’ EEZ in support of territorial defense operations.  
Figure 6 shows a summary of foreign vessel incursion in Philippine waters from 2016–
2019. All vessels identified with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia are fishing boats. On 




Figure 6. Foreign vessel incursion 2016−2019.91 
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D. AIS SYSTEMS 
MRIC is utilizing the U.S. SeaVision Satellite AIS monitoring systems. SeaVision 
“is a web-based maritime situational awareness tool that enables users to view and share a 
broad array of maritime information to improve maritime operations.”92 SeaVision has 
advanced filtering and search capabilities that can track multiple contacts to include slow-
moving vessels in high-risk areas and vessels of interest. It is capable of recording data 
suitable for 90 days. This low-cost visualization and management tool can correlate 
multiple data sources “necessary for conducting risk assessments, highlight anomalies, and 
generate alerts and warnings that automatically notify users.”93 
MRIC is also using MarineTraffic as part of its AIS monitoring system. 
MarineTraffic is a popular online ship tracking system used around the globe. It offers real-
time information on ships and ports worldwide via its website online. Data are collected 
from various AIS stations around the world through the service of satellite receivers. With 
the application of algorithms and other relevant data, the system provides useful 
information on shipping activities to concerned industries.94 This open, community-based 
project “operates more than 2,000 AIS stations in over 165 countries and has over 600,000 
registered users and around 20 million visits to its website every month.”95  
E. LINKAGES WITH REGIONAL AND LOCAL PARTNERS 
To augment its current monitoring systems, MRIC maintains collaborative efforts 
with international maritime partners and local maritime agencies for information sharing. 
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1. Regional Partners 
a. The Information Fusion Center (IFC) in Singapore acts as the 
regional maritime hub to enhance maritime situational awareness in Southeast Asia. The 
IFC was built to establish regional maritime domain awareness to cue timely responses by 
facilitating and catalyzing regional info-sharing cooperation and collective sense-making. 
To effectively deal with these maritime security threats, there is a need to share advanced 
maritime information for threat evaluation and anomaly detection. This hub enables greater 
awareness and understanding of the maritime domain to detect developing threat scenarios 
and trends and, ultimately, achieve early warning threats.96 The PN assigns an 
infrastructure liaison officer (ILO) who will facilitate coordination between MIRC and 
IFC. Through the ASEAN Information Sharing Portal (AIP), the IFC-ILO connection in 
real-time with the MRIC provides regular maritime situational updates and other periodic 
maritime security reports. These maritime updates are consolidated and screened for 
inclusion in the periodic maritime reports submitted to higher levels of command. 
b. MRIC also maintains a link with the Philippine Liaison Officer 
(PLO) in Manado and the Indonesian maritime security agency – BAKAMLA. Both 
sources provide support on maritime information between the Philippine Celebes sea and 
Indonesia’s Laut Sulawesi. Critical concerns for both countries focus on smuggling, 
hijacking, intrusion, infiltration, illegal entry, illegal fishing, illicit firearms smuggling, 
human trafficking, piracy, and marine pollution. 
c. The PN and Royal Thai Navy (RTN) agreed to enhance its defense 
cooperation to curb emerging threats and challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.97 The 
Thailand-Maritime Enforcement Operations Command Center (Thai-MECC) has fostered 
deeper ties with the MIRC regarding maritime information sharing. 
d. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) has 
established a linkage with the MRIC via an Automated Merchant Reporting System 
(AMRS), Asia-Pacific Intelligence Information Network (APIIN), Field Information 
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Support Tool (FIST), and Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System 
Cooperative Maritime Forces Pacific (CENTRIXS-CMFP). These communication 
platforms serve as the gateway for the exchange of real-time information between the 
United States and the Philippines 
2. Local partners 
Aside from having a direct linkage with NCWC, the MRIC has a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) on information sharing with the following government and non-
government agencies: AFP,  National Anti-Terrorism Task Force,  National Intelligence 
Coordinating Agency (NICA), Maritime Industry Authority, PCG, Philippine Ports 
Authority (PPA), Philippine National Police (PNP), Bureau of Customs (BOC), Bureau of 
Immigration and Deportation (BID), BFAR, Bureau of Quarantine and Health Services, 
National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources(DENR), DOST-PAGASA, Philippine Drug 
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), International Seafarers Action Center, and Philippine Inter-
Island Shipping Association. To facilitate this MOU, MIRC launched a website that serves 
as an information-sharing platform among the participants. 
F. DESIRED END STATE 
The desired goal of the PNMSAS is its full implementation of providing a common 
operating picture for decision-makers in pursuit of a maritime mission. This process must 
be sufficiently funded by the government and is complemented by an effective and efficient 
inter-operability structure. Due to the delegation of administrative control to NICTC, the 
subsequent maintenance of CEIS equipment facilitated a 24/7 operation LMS. This transfer 
also paved the way for a leaner MRIC whose core competency is intelligence production 
and analysis. The MRIC will now be more focused on collaborating with the different PN 
units and other maritime agencies through multiplatform maritime connectivity. The MRIC 
will serve as the backbone of PNMSAS and eventually evolve as the central hub for 
providing an in-depth analysis of the maritime environment. The MRIC is also looking into 
capability development on information warfare in line with maritime situational awareness. 
PNMSAS shall fully integrate its system with the Philippine Navy C4ISTAR System 
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capability development plan to ensure secure and effective communications systems 
between sensors and operating units. PN C4ISTAR exists as an information infrastructure 
for the command and control of a full range of Naval and Maritime Operations utilizing 
the Fleet-Marine forces within the maritime domain. 
G. CHALLENGES 
Since its establishment, PNMSAS has gradually developed a network of combined 
sensors, communication systems, and efficient workflow support of qualified operators to 
produce technologically-centered maritime surveillance platforms. During the early stage 
of PNMSAS, the MRIC has been the Philippine standard in vessel traffic monitoring, 
identification, and evaluating potential risky situations in the maritime domain. In the 
beginning, the MRIC had brand new advanced sensors such as RADARs, AIS, and high-
resolution cameras, together with highly advanced software programs that collect, 
distribute, and display maritime information. Additionally, during its early stages, 
PNMSAS provided an outline for a PN vessel visual sensing system and shipping traffic 
monitoring. Another regular application of the system during its developmental phase was 
monitoring physical boundaries in coastal areas. 
Currently, the PNMSAS is now confronting the rapid development of sensor 
technology, deteriorating equipment, and limited funding. The information processing 
system and the hardware used for extensive maritime surveillance are fast becoming 
obsolete due to increasing technological developments. With an ever-dynamic maritime 
environment and extensive data requirements, there is a need to acquire the latest maritime 
surveillance system. However, the acquisition of such technology is dependent on the 
availability of adequate financial resources. The PNMSAS detection system, due to 
obsolescence, limited fund source, and equipment wear and tear, currently has limited 
capacity to develop into a full-blown maritime surveillance system.98 The following are 
identified gaps in the PNMSAS detection and identification system: 
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1. Different MSA platforms are using AIS with 40 nautical mile detection 
coverage. The reception radius of 40 nautical miles is subject to various factors such as the 
transmission signal’s power, the height of the transmitting ship’s aerial and meteorological 
conditions. Further, since AIS is satellite-based, poor reception can only provide 20 
nautical miles of detection coverage, or 350 nautical miles for powerful transmissions 
during appropriate atmospheric conditions.99  Another limitation is that the AIS requires a 
cooperative target. Transponders are only required for ships that weigh 300 gross weight 
tons (GWT) or larger under the U.N.’s  International Maritime Organization, or IMO. AIS 
is also vulnerable to spoofing, making the vessel appear far from its actual location. A 
vessel transmits a Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) code, which is supposed to 
be distinct from other vessels. Spoofing is being conducted when multiple vessels are 
simultaneously broadcasting the same MMSI number.100 Another loophole is that AIS 
transmitters can also be turned off manually by the deck officers. This method is widely 
known as “going dark” or “dark activity.” Thus, AIS can be manipulated easily. Lastly, the 
AIS receiver can be susceptible to technical malfunctions like any other computer 
system.101 
2. Various platforms are using “X” and “S” band marine radars, where the 
former is used for more accurate display due to its higher frequency while the latter is 
mainly used during inclement weather and for identification and tracking.102 The “X” band 
radars are commonly installed in small vessels since it produces a 2.5 to 4 cm (8 to 12 GHz) 
wavelength. “S” band radars can produce 8 to 15 cm (2 to 5 GHz), or roughly a 24-NM 
detection overage, and is better fitted in larger vessels. Marine radars’ limitations include 
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the non-detection of small vessels, failure to display targets in the radars’ shadow and blind 
sectors, range discrimination, bearing discrimination, and false echoes.103 
3. Cameras have four nautical miles of visual coverage only and cannot 
monitor those activities or incidents beyond their reach. 
In terms of area coverage effectiveness, an assessment team from NICTC was 
activated in 2015 to conduct an in-depth study of LMS responsiveness.104 It was found out 
that some LMS is not as responsive as what the navy was hoping for, and the proposed 
plans are to deactivate, downgrade, or turnover the LMS to other government maritime 
agencies. The parameters used for identifying the LMS’s responsiveness are that they must 
be situated near sea lines of communication (SLOCs), maritime chokepoints, monitored 
routes of Chinese commercial vessels, critical maritime infrastructures, petroleum service 
contract areas, and known terrorist routes. Another parameter is the situational awareness 
coverage for the Kalayaan Group of Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and the Philippine rise. 
PNMSAS has an insufficient number of research analysts required to consolidate 
and assess maritime information collected on the human resource aspect. Some of the 
MSACs utilize research analysts on a contractual basis to meet the demand for information 
assessment. The small number of analysts and the demands of their work prevent analysts 
from attending specialized training to advance their skills. 
H. INNOVATIONS  
Despite the ongoing challenges, the PNMSAS has learned some management 
practices that enhance maritime situational awareness without relying on expensive 
technology. Given the expanse of the West Philippine Sea, the detection capability of LMS 
is insufficient. The LMS coastal radars’ detection capability only has a maximum reach of 
40 nautical miles, depending on its elevation. There is a need to employ other means to 
monitor the areas beyond the reach of the LMS. One innovation was to network with 
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Filipino fishing boats in the WPS. In 2012, MSAC-West and LMS Zambales started a 
system with Filipino fishers plying the different areas of the WPS to include Scarborough 
Shoal and the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG). This networking resulted in an information-
sharing mechanism that is mutually beneficial to both parties. Selected Filipino fishers 
monitor the area where they are fishing and report back to the nearest LMS, via H.F. radio, 
of any foreign vessel intrusion. These reports would include poaching activities of fishing 
vessels or harassment activities of military ships patrolling in the WPS. This network 
scheme also holds for fishing companies recruited as members of the PN Affiliated Reserve 
Units (PNARU). 
The WPS is not the only area experiencing an increase in Chinese activity. During 
the last quarter of 2016, there have been sightings of Chinese research vessels in the 
Philippine Rise. MSAC-North deemed it necessary to expand its Filipino fishing boat 
network in early 2017 towards Luzon’s eastern side. The Filipino fishermen report back to 
MSAC-North via secured channels on foreign vessels engaged in marine scientific research 
or poaching. In return for their cooperation, the MSACs provide radio equipment and 
weather information to the network of fishing boats. Filipino fishers have no access to 
weather information as these areas are often remote, and the only means of communication 
possible is through high-frequency radio. The MSAC was not only able to collect data, but 
it also supported the safety of the fisherfolks at sea. 
This monitoring and reporting system with the fishing boat network showed an 
innovative way of maintaining situational awareness in areas where current maritime 
surveillance systems cannot reach. It also established an additional low-tech method of 
achieving maritime situational awareness. The downside in this setup is that MSA is 
dependent on the availability of the fishermen in the area as they perform their work. These 
force multipliers can only be utilized in passive information collection since their primary 
purpose is to earn a living. They cannot be directed to leave their fishing ground to proceed 
to another area of interest.  
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The PN also started planning out the establishment of a maritime Citizen Armed 
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) for deployment in the KIG and Scarborough Shoal.105 
This planned fishing militia will be armed to protect Filipino fishers from the aggressive 
tactics of PAFMM. They will also be directed to conduct active information collection of 
foreign activities in their designated AOR. Furthermore, maritime CAFGU can be 
mobilized to support emergency response operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster 
response operations. The navy militia members will be selected from the Philippine Army 
CAFGU from the same regional command and trained by the PN. However, the plan was 
suspended this November 5 to avoid actions that might be misinterpreted as a catalyst for 
war.106  
I. MARITIME SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE APPROACH 
It has been deduced that direct military confrontation is not the Philippines’ 
approach and is willing to take against China’s gray zone operations in the WPS’s disputed 
waters. While the AFP waits for an adequate deterrence posture in the WPS, through its 
modernization programs, and effective MSA must be in place to continually monitor and 
record Chinese activities that will serve as evidence for any legal actions in the future. With 
the deferment on the utilization of fishing militias as an additional approach to maritime 
situational awareness, there is no other recourse for the Philippine Navy but to utilize its 
forces to augment the MIRC in the MDA Situational awareness. According to Grimeland 
and Van der Veen, selecting a suitable force that can operate in the littorals must be able 
to react on short notice.107  They must be able to operate effectively in areas where irregular 
forces abound. It should also be added that most governments would want a force that 
could conduct surgical insertion with a minimal footprint in a given maritime mission area. 
With these considerations, the top of mind force most suitable for MDA situational 
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awareness missions is the PN’s maritime special operations forces (SOF). While it holds 
that conventional forces can also handle MDA situational awareness functions, maritime 
“SOF are often entrusted to perform missions that exceed the authority given to 
conventional military units, such as operating in politically sensitive environments or 
executing tasks that require special legal authorities.”108 According to Bucci, “Although 
they are not a substitute for other capabilities in the military, SOF can mitigate risk by 
helping to set the operating environment in the most advantageous manner possible.”109  
For more than a decade, the PN’s maritime SOFs have been conducting 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations on land-based missions. Most often, 
they are relegated to supporting roles for ground SOF operations. These maritime SOF 
have been dragged away from their maritime roots, so that their ability to perform in the 
maritime domain is dubious. With the external defense in mind, maritime SOFs should 
gradually shift back to their maritime niche, which is the foundation of their respective 
organization in the first place. The maritime threats emanating from Chinese gray zone 
operations in the WPS should be a compelling reason for Philippine maritime SOF to start 
focusing on their core competencies in the maritime domain.  
J. ROLE OF MARITIME SPECIAL OPERATION FORCE 
In acquiring a more precise grasp on the possible role of SOFs in MDA Situational 
Awareness, it is essential to review the capabilities they can offer to the PNMSAS. The 
AFP Joint Special Operations Manual (interim) defines special operations (SO) as 
“operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve 
military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic, national objectives employing direct 
or indirect unique military capabilities as a scalable option (Land Maneuver Concept, 
Philippine Army) beyond the capability of conventional forces.”110  To elaborate more on 
the peculiarities of SOF, Joint Publication 3-05 added that “SO require unique modes of 
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employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are characterized by 
one or more of the following: time sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, 
work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and 
cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk.”111  SO also provides decision-makers with 
distinct and accurate tactical and operational alternatives to fit any interagency partners’ 
related task. Other SOF characteristics include competence in operating advance military 
equipment, out-of-the-box thinking, and operating with a minimal support tail.112 
Maritime SOFs have a plethora of capabilities that can be utilized in the maritime 
domain. These capabilities can be applied to different degrees and variations throughout 
the spectrum of warfare. However, this study has not encountered any concepts or doctrine 
specific to special operations for MDA situational awareness. With the Philippines’ thrust 
for a peaceful means of settling the WPS disputes, a maritime SOF operating framework 
should be limited to the capabilities in the lower level of the spectrum of warfare, or SO 
activities that are way under the threshold of war. Naturally, MSA would involve indirect 
approaches of maritime SOF in the operating environment. The Naval Special Operations 
Command (NAVSOCOM) is the designated special operations unit of the Philippine 
Navy.113 It is one of the most dependable strike forces in the maritime domain, yet its 
capabilities also fit the functions of a defensive MDA that does not involve armed 
confrontation. 
K. NAVAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 
The mission of the NAVSOCOM is to organize, train, equip, maintain, and deploy 
Naval Special Operations Forces for the conduct of Naval, Joint, Combined, and Inter-
Agency operations in support of the PN mission.114 Among the operating units under 
NAVSOCOM is the Sea-Air-Land Group (SEALG), whose mission is to provide readily 
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deployable SEAL teams to the different Naval Special Operations Units (NAVSOUs) 
across the archipelago in support of NAVSOCOM mission. Among the SEAL operations 
capabilities that are applicable for MSA are: 
a. Special reconnaissance. It is being conducted by the SEAL or Sniper Teams 
“to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information 
concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual potential enemy, or to 
secure data concerning meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a 
particular area.” 115 Target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance are 
also included in this function. This enabling capability supplements intelligence 
requirements provided by conventional intelligence units. It complements the evaluation 
of information to determine its accuracy, timeliness, usability, completeness, precision, and 
reliability.  
b. Unconventional warfare. “It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct-
offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations and indirect subversion 
activities, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escapes…It is a spectrum of 
military and paramilitary operations, typically of long duration, predominately conducted 
by SEAL Teams organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed, by the larger 
forces.”116 
Most of the time, these capabilities are intertwined to create a more robust 
situational awareness activity. Perhaps one of the best historical accounts of these 
capabilities being utilized for defensive MDA by an operating force is the coast-watchers 
during World War II. Under the code name FERDINAND, the Solomon Islands watchers 
were composed of plantation owners and managers explicitly recruited to monitor and 
observe Japanese activity.117 The code name, derived from the storybook character that 
preferred smelling flowers to fighting, is a reminder that the watchers’ primary role is as 
lookouts, not fighters. During that time, the region’s intelligence gaps were filled with 
small teams armed with binoculars and radios. They played a significant role as an early 
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warning network, especially during the Guadalcanal campaign. The SEAL team’s role in 
the MDA situational awareness of the WPS is likened to this historical account. SEAL 
teams can establish a mass base of coastal community and fisherfolk watchers to gather 
information on Chinese and other foreign vessel activity in the WPS. If the government 
decides to push through with the implementation of fishing militias, the SEAL teams can 
play an active role in the militias’ organization and training. This scheme will free up some 
of the MIRC responsibilities to focus on the analysis of the information gathered. What is 
revealing with the Coastwatcher account is they fully utilized low cost/low technology 
approach to maritime surveillance. 
On the other hand, the SEAL team’s advantage is that it simultaneously utilizes low 
and high technology. It can communicate with coast-watcher volunteers on the use of 
commercially available and low-cost radio communications. At the same time, it can utilize 
fishing vessels equipped with radars, night visions, signal intelligence (SIGINT) 
capabilities, and acoustic sensors when conducting SR. The use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAV) for coastal surveillance is also available for the SEAL Teams.  
The conduct of SR aboard fishing vessels is to gather as much information on 
Chinese aggressive gray zone tactics that can be used for counter-tactics planning. This 
method was observed in the fight of the Sri Lankan Navy against the Sea Tigers. According 
to Povlok, one factor that significantly contributed to the Sri Lankan Navy against the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, also known as Tamil Tigers) was creating the 
Special Boat Squadron (SBS).118 The U.S. SOF-trained SBS personnel were deployed to 
penetrate and conduct surveillance and reconnaissance activities in LTTE territory. 
Information was relayed to the Rapid Action Boat Squadrons to intercept the maritime 
insurgent force. For the SEAL teams, they can relay information to mobile sensors such as 
the vectoring of Maritime Patrol Aircraft to document a given contact’s activities.  
One other advantage in deploying the SEAL teams for MDA situational awareness 
is that they can quickly shift from passive defensive MDA posture to more aggressive gray 
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zone tactics when the needs arise. Although this will be highly unlikely soon, having front 
lines’ forces with these capabilities give many options for decision-makers. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
As a sizeable archipelagic nation, the Philippines needs a comprehensive MDA 
capability to counter increased state and non-state maritime threats. For several decades, 
the Philippines’ lack of focus on MDA has incapacitated its diplomatic and military 
response to China’s maritime threats, undermining its sovereignty under international law. 
China’s growing dominance has also forced the rapid development of defense capabilities 
among countries having interests and territorial claims in the region. 
The Philippines is building up its defense posture through its modernization 
program, hoping that it will serve as a form of deterrence against China’s aggressive 
behavior. However, given China’s military strength, the formidable defense posture the 
Philippines is envisioning should be sufficient enough that it can serve as a tripwire in time 
for the Philippines and its allies to respond. This defense system should be established in 
case China pursue its claims in the WPS by force. Part of that defense system is the MDA 
situational awareness capability. 
While it has developed its maritime surveillance system through available 
technology, there are still many challenges confronting PNMSAS. Obsolete equipment will 
continuously degrade the surveillance capability of different land-based and mobile 
platforms. While the modernization of the AFP pushes through with the acquisition of 
brand-new maritime surveillance systems, the quantity and quality would still not be 
enough in providing nation-wide coverage. Given the existing procurement process and 
budgetary constraints, it would also take some time before the equipment is delivered. With 
these limitations, it is appropriate to look for other means of enhancing maritime situational 
awareness while waiting to acquire modern surveillance systems. Among the innovations 
the PNMSAS has introduced, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) plays an essential role in 
filling in the ISR capabilities gap. Crucial insight can be provided through information 
collection by HUMINT. Other countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and China have 
recognized the importance of establishing a maritime HUMINT network on every coastal 
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community and marine sector. The Philippine Navy planned to launch its fishing militia 
this year, but the plan was shelved due to the avoidance of miscalculations. As a 
supplemental approach, the Philippine Navy should maximize its maritime special force to 
fill the MDA gaps. The maritime special operations force’s utilization offers a low-cost 
and low-tech solution to plug in the numerous gaps. It also brings them back to the maritime 
niche, which they have neglected due to the land-based counterinsurgency and counter-
terrorism operations. In collaboration with intelligence personnel, SEALs could operate 
portable coastal radars situated at a higher elevation to increase the range to fill LMS 
coverage gaps while onshore. On the water, the SEAL teams could also utilize innocuous-
looking vessels such as fishing boats, tourism vessels, or small high-speed crafts to 
investigate suspicious contacts. Simultaneously, the SEAL teams could experiment on IR 
sensors with magnification, modest Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) to detect suspect the  
bearings of radar, Communication Intelligence (COMINT) to detect ship-to-ship or ship-
to-shore conversations, and reporting procedures.  
NAVSOCOM, through its SEAL teams, has the capability to conduct defensive 
MDA situational awareness. Their UW capability allows them to link with coastal and 
fisherfolk communities to establish a network of coast-watcher volunteers. In case the 
fishing militia gets national approval, the SEAL teams could spearhead the training 
process. In terms of SR, the SEAL team can utilize a mix of high and low technology to 
gather information on an adversary’s activities. Information gathered can provide decision-
makers with a complete operating picture of the situation. Counter-tactical procedures can 
also be produced from the information gathered.  
The Philippine Navy should reorient and start integrating NAVSOCOM in MDA 
situational awareness roles as part of its territorial defense operations. The PN should also 
start to plan out the acquisition of emerging capabilities such as UAVs and acoustic sensors 
deployed by NAVSOCOM. With the fusion of these emerging collection capabilities and 
NAVSOCOMs’ core competencies, near-real-time awareness will be maximized. Constant 
awareness and documentation will be the backbone for the Philippines’ defense against a 




 NAVSOCOM should include MDA situational awareness in its SEAL manual as 
one of its core functions. It should develop tactics and procedures necessary in performing 
MDA situational awareness in a passive defensive mode and active offensive mode. The 
SEAL group should start enhancing its doctrines extending the scope of UW and SR for 
seaborne operations. It should not only be limited to inland or coastal operations. 
The Philippine Navy should craft a standard operating procedure to facilitate the 
inter-unit collaboration between the SEAL team units and MSACs in their respective AOR. 
2. Training 
 The Naval Special Operations Training and Doctrine Center (NAVSOTDC) should 
incorporate in its training program the concepts of MDA and Command and Control. The 
development effort for this training should be to “Conduct effective persistent maritime 
surveillance operations, in support of Reconnaissance and Surveillance (RS) activities, for 
no less than 24 hours using multiple tactical and technical collection platforms within a 
maritime environment.”119 
NAVSOCOM should coordinate with Special Operations Command Pacific 
(SOCPAC) for future military exercises integrating UW and SR capabilities for MDA 
situational awareness. The Philippine Navy should also link NAVSOCOM with other 
maritime SOF from Australia, Japan, South Korea, India, and others. The objective in 
working closely with allies and partners is to experiment with various tactics, techniques, 
technologies, and procedures to see which work best at filling current gaps in the 
Philippines’ MDA coverage. 
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3. Future Research 
Future studies may include an in-depth analysis of the importance of maritime SOF 
in MDA through historical case studies of successful maritime SOF activities. The coast-
watcher and the Sri Lanka Civil War cases are a good starting point. This research was 
limited only to email correspondence and secondary sources. Site visits and personal 
interviews could shed more light on the gaps of PNMSAS. 
This study was also confined to the subject of the Philippine Navy. Future studies 
could focus on a higher national level, such as the interagency coordination of maritime 
operating units that fall under the National Coast Watch Stations. The AFPSOCOM could 
also be integrated into the system and bring to the table its various SOF for MDA roles. 
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